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Within the borders of Europe, the raia  (literally: line) between Spain and Portugal is quite 
singular. This, among other reasons, is due to its long history as a limit between two States and to its 
permanent absence in the main processes of modernization and development. Despite this, and for the 
border regions, the entrance of Portugal and Spain into the European Community did allow the 
establishment of the essential conditions for the formation of a new model of relations and development. 
The expectations generated in the border regions relating to this new model -symbolized in particular by 
the INTERREG initiative, in overcoming the chronic problems of socio-economic articulation and 
development will not materialise as expected if convergence processes at regional level are taken into 
account. Despite the positive interventions, these regions continue to lag far behind more dynamic areas 
with a higher living standard on the Iberian Peninsula, such that the asymmetries and inequalities between 




  The Spanish-Portuguese border is of singular interest within the European context. The 
dictatorships of Salazar and Franco were characterised by an iron-fisted control that contributed strongly 
to the hermetic nature of the border and the disarticulation of the trans-border territories. The advent of 
Democracy in the two Iberian countries was accompanied by a more flexible understanding of the 
previous model that, through a reduction and relaxing of control, allowed the border to become relatively 
“permeable”. The simultaneous adhesion of Spain and Portugal into the European Community heralded 
the arrival of a new, more open model of relations, with new perspectives for regional development that   2
would progressively help to extinguish the pernicious consequences of many decades of strong 
impermeabilisation of the border and the marginalisation of these regions. 
  
Despite the foregoing, the improvements seen over the past few years, the evolution of the 
Spanish-Portuguese border regions and of the actual process of integration itself at this level started out 
with certain problems. Thus, the development of border regions (in comparison with the national means) 
was not even in general what was being sought and neither was the process of economic integration at 
trans-border level convergent to the same degree with the integration of the two Iberian economies. 
  
In this sense, in this paper we shall attempt first to give an account of the background and 
scenario prevailing in the border regions at the time Spain and Portugal joined the Community as well as 
of the major features of this new model of relations and development. Later on, we shall try to explore 
how the border regions managed to assimilate this new model and the main territorial impacts of the 
actual process of European integration, then going on to offer some of what we consider to be the main 
impediments to trans-border integration in the case of Spain and Portugal. 
 
2. THE ENTRY INTO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE NEW MODEL OF 
RELATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT. 
  As is usual in the case of most contemporary borders, the dynamics and the forms of relations at 
the Spanish-Portuguese border along the twentieth century have been intrinsically determined by the 
relationship between the two States; that is, between the respective leaders or governments. For this 
period, the eminently border-related issues played a relatively small role in the climate of the 
understanding between Portugal and Spain, this was being governed by other types of factors; mainly the 
existence (or not) of consensus between the two existing political systems or the fitting of each country 
into the international scene. During this period, the relations between these two countries can be 
appropriately described as follows: “Portugal and Spain are like a family household based only on 
appearances, since they sleep in different beds” (PINTADO and BARRENECHEA, 1974: 212). In this 
sense, if one excepts the strategic domain of water resources, cross-border issues have been completely 
marginalized during the last century, both in the internal context and within the context of bilateral 
relations between the two states. 
  Equally marginal (or marginalized) were the corresponding border regions, divorced from the 
processes and benefits of industrial development and urban growth which were at the time emerging in 
certain areas of the Iberian Peninsula better endowed with the human resources available to drive such 
processes. To understand the evolution of these areas, it is crucial to take into account the considerable 
progress in territorial organisation and industrial and urban development of the fifties and sixties, which 
in the case of Portugal and Spain gave preference to coastal areas as compared with the marginalisation of 
interior regions. 
  
In sum, although both sides of the border were strongly unconsolidated, they were indeed subject 
to similar socio-economic processes that gradually imposed and assembled a cycle of “peripheralisation”   3
and underdevelopment (comparatively the most dynamic areas) that led them to being known as the 
“Frontier of Underdevelopment” in the middle of the sixties (PINTADO and BARRENECHEA, 1974). 
  
The consolidation of two democratic systems in both countries and the process of adhesion to the 
EC finally contributed to a situation in which –progressively- a new system of (mutual) understanding 
was established. This was formally recorded in the new “Spanish-Portuguese Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation” in May 1978 (it replaced the so-called Pacto Ibérico, in existence since 1939) and the spirit 
of this has gradually been enhanced by several summit’s, among others, between the two countries 
(starting in 1983). This new scenario of relations between Spain and Portugal was accompanied by a 
relative permissiveness in the control and policing of the border, an attitude that was slowly assimilated 
by the governments themselves of the two countries; a prime example of this was the agreement stating 
that it was not a formal requisite to produce a passport when crossing the border between the two 
countries (April, 1977). 
  
Nevertheless, this new spirit of understanding failed to involve any substantial changes as 
regards the situation prevailing in the border regions, in particular as regards promoting integration and 
articulating the territories and their citizens. Regarding such articulation, as an example one sees that in 
1986 –the year when both countries joined the EC, there were only 19 permanent border posts. Among 
these, only 8 allowed the passage of merchandise and only three were open 24 hours a day. Moreover, 
“some of the border posts, on the Portuguese side, allowed the passage of merchandise but this was not 
reciprocated on the Spanish side, which virtually prohibited the export-import of such goods” (GEPAT, 
1987: 2). Bearing in mind that the Spanish-Portuguese border has an extension of approximately 1200 
Km, we feel that these data offer a fairly lucid account of the degree of territorial and institutional 
articulation that really existed between the two countries at the time of their joining the EC. 
 
The Spanish-Portuguese Border Regions in the Mid-eighties. 
  In the mid-eighties the Spanish-Portuguese border regions began to draw closer to the EC, 
although their starting point had a very poor level of development. More than anything else they had been 
marked by a devastating emigration, (which had occurred in the previous two decades), a very low birth 
rate, an aging population and a very reduced demographic density. It should be stressed that not all the 
border regions found themselves in such a situation since both on the Spanish and on the Portuguese side 
of the border the coastal border areas (in particular the districts of Braga and Faro and the provinces of 
Pontevedra and Huelva) were special cases in the border environment, especially as regards demographic 
dynamics and occupation density. With the exception of these latter cases, however, all the other spatial 
units (provinces and districts) underwent strong population losses between 1960 and 1981 and in most 
cases such losses were as high as 20%. In themselves, they were usually low population density areas 
since, even though they represented almost one quarter of the surface area of both countries, they hardly 
contained 13% of the population. Thus, the Portuguese part had a density of 47.5 inhabitants/Km
2 and the 
Spanish part a density of 39.3 inhabitants/Km
2,, although even lower values were sometimes reached 
(21.1 inhabitants/Km
2 in the province of Cáceres, or 18.4 inhabitants/Km
2 in the district of Beja).   4
  
In terms of production, these regions were eminently rural, based on an agricultural system, and 
indeed there was little real industrial initiative. In 1981, the active population involved in agriculture was 
33.5% on the Portuguese side and 33.9% on the Spanish one, in contrast to the respective values of 21.1% 
and 15.4% for industry. Only the districts of Braga and Faro and the provinces of Huelva and Pontevedra 
could be considered candidates, at that time, as regions not based on a mainly agricultural system, unlike 
some of the other cases in which the active population involved in agriculture accounted for more than 
half of the total active population (the case, for example, of Bragança and the district of Vila Real). 
  
However, the limitations of this economic structure were also due to the available human 
resources, who in comparison with other areas had a tremendously low level of training. In the 
Portuguese case - in relation to all the border districts- the absolute majority of the population (always 
above 80 percent) had a degree of academic training equivalent or lower than primary school (four years 
of schooling) and on the Spanish side the situation was little better, the percentage of the population with 
the same level being the majority (always above 50 percent). All this was accompanied by vast 
percentages of illiteracy, ranging between 17 and 35 percent in the case of the Portuguese side of the 
border (districts of Braga and Beja, respectively) and between 3.1 and 12.3 on the Spanish side (provinces 
of Salamanca and Huelva, respectively). At the other extreme (i.e., higher education) the panorama was 
equally despondent since on the Portuguese side the population of people in possession of a degree in 
higher education did not even reach one percent, while on the Spanish side it only reached 3%. 
  
As may be seen, at the beginning of the eighties, the border regions were already low-density 
spaces, marked by the absence of any major urban centres of any relevant dimension or dynamic import 
with respect to both the European and domestic scales. In fact, although close to the border even the cases 
of Badajoz or Vigo-Pontevedra in Spain can be cited in this sense since on the Portuguese side there were 
no comparable centres to these and not even any centres with any kind of supra-regional influence. 
  
During the seventies and eighties, despite most of the Spanish-Portuguese border regions being 
eminently peripheral and characterised by a low population density (not only in demographic terms but 
also as regards social, economic aspects , etc.), they were in fact able to benefit from certain quite 
“energetic” localised economic developments, essentially relating to the border itself. It would be true to 
say that parallel to the increase in the flows (goods, merchandise and capital) between the two countries, 
areas were consolidated in which economic activity -focused directly or indirectly on the border (sectors 
linked to customs activity, restaurants, trans-border commerce, financial activity, etc)- was quite vigorous 
and led to local border production systems with a certain degree of articulation and complementarity 
(between both countries). Examples are the Valença-Tuy tandem, or those of Vilar Formoso-Fuentes de 
Oñoro and Elvas-Badajoz. In the case of the Spanish-Portuguese border these were thus merely small 
economic “oases”, dependent essentially upon the functionalisation of the border, customs activities, and 
the pronounced “hermetic” nature of the border. 
   5
The New Model of Development and Relations 
  Upon the simultaneous adhesion of Spain and Portugal to the European Community in 1986 and 
the numerous structural changes that this huge step demanded, a new model of relations and development 
for the Spanish-Portuguese border regions began to emerge. This new model, encompassed within the 
global process of European integration, was focused on the renovation or strengthening of certain factors 
that characterised the previous model, essentially, as regards institutional aspects, functional changes at 
the border, and the available financial tools/media. 
  
In institutional terms, the most important change derives from the adoption of  the EC legislation 
and from the introduction of a supra-national identity, within an environment that  had hitherto been tied 
to a most profound national sovereignty, all this occurring simultaneously  with the acceleration of the 
process of European integration itself. Later- after adhesion- the imperative of moving towards an 
effective Single Market, which implied the elimination of many barriers (physical, fiscal and technical), 
led to the Single European Act, which was to enter into existence in 1987 and promoted the following 
steps: a Single Market and Economic and Monetary Union. Within a relatively short period of time, for 
the Spanish-Portuguese border and respective intervention policies this process came to represent a 
significant functional mutation, and -at the same time as permitting the free circulation of people, 
merchandise, capital and services- it allowed the almost complete reduction of all border controls and the 
progressive abolition of customs activities, simultaneously and equally, on both sides of the border. 
Likewise, the new model emerged as one featuring a sharp increase in the functional “permeability” of 
the border –incepted by decree and by the dismantling of most of the border’s control infrastructures. 
Nevertheless, despite these actions there was still a strong degree of disarticulation between the border 
regions and the border continued to be markedly “impermeable”. At that time, it was assumed that, later 
on, the integration process (and respective financial media) was to correct this. 
  In the light of what has been emerging for several years now, the bilateral relations between 
Spain and Portugal supported at least the feeling of a new model, once the long-awaited path of European 
integration (together with the available financial resources) could no longer be perturbed by strife or 
negligence relative to consolidation the Single Market, based on border issues, had been undertaken. 
Thus, several agreements were set up to resolve certain problems deriving from this issue, such as the 
cooperative agreement for the fight against drugs in 1987 and the agreements for cooperation and 
reciprocity in the field of civilian protection, collaboration between the two country’s police forces, 
highway security, and fiscalisation of the border areas in 1992. At the same time -although on another 
scale- new institutional frameworks began to emerge, of special relevance in the border setting. Here, we 
refer to a large body of agreements and trans-border cooperation institutions that, since the eighties, have 
proliferated (not infrequently on a short-term or even unfruitful basis) under many guises. Examples are 
Working Communities, Cooperation Protocols, Border Initiative Agencies, Trans-Border Associations for 
Local Development, Trans-border Municipal Associations, etc. These have established a new framework 
for trans-border cooperation, based essentially on a formal concept. 
  Another essential and original aspect of this new model undoubtedly refers to the available 
financial tools/media. As well as the generic financial supports made available by the Community -in   6
particular through its Regional Policies- stress should be placed on those that are destined directly for 
improvement of the level of development of the border regions; to the adaptation of these to the Single 
Market, and to the promotion of trans-border cooperation networks, such as INTERREG. Theoretically, 
this Community Initiative Program would allow border regions to access not only large amounts of 
money, dedicated to the issue in question and the resolution of historical weaknesses, but also to effective 
trans-border tools for programming and planning, which had hitherto been impracticable and politically 
inconceivable a few years before. 
  In the past -excluding the strategic question of water resources- the understanding attained 
(sometimes in a completely occult fashion) concerning issues of import for the border (of which political 
oppression and persecution must unfortunately be included) had almost always been in the sense of 
reinforcing control over and “impermeabilising” it; that is, a voluntary and organised exercise of trans-
border cooperation, but in the sense of separation and disarticulation. In this sense, the new model of 
relations and development for the Spanish-Portuguese border regions encompassed a truly innovative 
attitude, at least with respect to the previous fifty years of its history. 
  At the end of the eighties, this new model and the political and financial juncture encompassing 
it were institutionally assumed to be “the last opportunity that these regions will have to initiate a 
movement towards transformation that will allow them to face up, with some degree of confidence, to the 
new economic reality that the Single Market will bring with it” (DGDR, 1989: 6). 
 
Expectations and Aspirations for the Border Regions. 
    The vision of a new model, together with its innovative attitudes and its financial tools, 
legitimately enhanced the expectations and reinforced the aspirations of the border regions. The starting 
point was the assumption that this new model, based on the funds stemming from the consolidation of the 
Single Market and on the “opening of borders”, was to achieve in a relatively short period of time, and 
indeed almost automatically, the complete elimination of the nefarious consequences of many decades of 
strong border “impermeablisation” and of the marginalisation of the border regions. 
 
  To correct the initial nefarious effects of the actual process of partial defunctionalisation of the 
border, certain supports were put into play, through which the promotion of integration at trans-border 
scale seemed ensured, such as a substantial increase in the level of development of these regions. To take 
these border regions to a safe port from the storm, the new model would contribute to the consolidation of 
positive dynamics such as (i) the relocalisation of border regions within territories aspiring to be 
transnational; (ii) the reorganisation of the production systems of the border regions, by extending their 
hinterlands and through new comparative advantages in terms of centrality and accessibility; (iii) a 
generalised interiorisation of a trans-border vision of the markets, economic agents, institutions, resources 
and territories; (iv), the development and implementation of trans-border infrastructures; (v) promotion of 
trans-border cooperation at all levels, in the sense of making the available strategies compatible and using 
available resources more rationally. 
 
3. THE SCANT MATERIALISATION OF THE NEW MODEL AND THE MAIN 
INSUFFICIENCIES IN THE PROCESS OF TRANS-BORDER INTEGRATION.   7
  Despite the considerable expectations that the new model of relations and development 
introduced, the evolution of the Spanish-Portuguese trans-border regions, and of the trans-border 
integration process itself during the 15 years following the adhesion of the two countries to the EC, the 
pathway envisaged could not be followed. In this sense, in general the development of the border regions 
was not as expected either, with the respective consequences in terms of economic cohesion, and the 
process of economic integration at trans-border level was not equally convergent with the integration of 
several different economies either, in particular as regards the accelerated nature of the process of 
economic fusion between Portugal and Spain. 
  
A plethora of factors must have been involved in this evolution; grosso modo, these can be 
decanted into two schools of thought. The first would encompass the large processes of economic and 
territorial reorganisation then in course in the Iberian Peninsula, which have distanced most border 
regions from the main scenarios of economic development in Spain and Portugal in recent years. The 
second one corresponds to the particular environment of the border itself or, more specifically, to the 
scale of the trans-border regions, in which certain “inertias” were to emerge that would act in 
contradiction to the anticipated evolution. 
 
The Timid Rhythm of Development and the Weak Reinforcement of Intra-national Economic 
Cohesion. 
   In comparison with the situation prevailing at the beginning of the eighties, discussed above, the 
Spanish and Portuguese border regions underwent a positive evolution. However, it is of interest to 
analyse this evolution within the framework of the respective countries with a view to discovering 
whether this evolution was in the sense of convergence and national cohesion or whether, by contrast, and 
in spite of being positive, it instead reinforced the peripheral nature of these regions. For this short 
exercise, we shall analyse the evolution of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at market prices for the 
border NUT3 level (which we shall refer to as border regions) for the period 1988-1997 for Portugal and 
for 1987-1998 for Spain. 
 
  In the case of Portugal, for the 1988-1997 period, growth of the per capita GDP was continuous 
for all the border regions. However, with respect to the national total-with the exception of the Algarve- 
they had a per capita GDP that was considerably lower than the national mean, in most cases with a 
differential of more than 20% (in 1997). Likewise, overall the Portuguese border regions in terms of per 
capita GDP did converge towards the national mean, passing from 74% in 1988 to 79% in 1997. An 
individual analysis of each unit allows the perception of certain trends: 
 
•  The border regions that between 1990 and 1993 were strongly divergent with respect to the 
national mean, thereafter recovering, either very slowly (as is the case of Douro, the Alto 
Alentejo and the Baixo Alentajeo) or more vigorously (Alentejo Central). 
•  The border regions in which a relatively stable convergence occurred along the process, either 
more intense (Cavado, Minho-Lima and Alto Trás-os-Montes) or less intense (Beira Interior 
Norte and Beira Interior Sul).   8
•  The particular case of the Algarve, where, starting out with a per capita GDP above the national 
mean, there was divergence along the period. 
 
In the case of Portugal, it can therefore be said that, although rather timidly, the border regions 
have converged with respect to the national mean, at least in terms of per capita GDP. Nevertheless, this 
does not correspond to a change in the actual position of these regions within the national context, 
especially since a large part of this convergence arose through the demographic route; that is, it did not 
essentially depend on pure expansion of production but rather on the reduced population (the loss of 
population across the border regions was significant and in some cases surpassed 10%, in contrast to the 
stability of the national population). 
  
This is confirmed by the stagnation that the weight of the GDP of all the border regions has been 
subject to in the national total; i.e., as regards the per capita GDP, the border regions have converged 
very slowly with respect to the national mean, although they did not change their position (marginal) in 
the overall national set. 
 
Chart 1 – Total and relative per capita GDP (national total =100) in the Portuguese border 
NUTS 3 level from 1988 to 1997 
(x1.000 esc.) 
1988    1989    1990    1991    1992    1993    1994    1995    1996    1997   
National total  709 100 841  100 994  100 1.146 100 1.291 100 1.361 100 1.476 100 1.594 100 1.693 100  1.797 100 
Minho-Lima 403  57 483  57 583  59  686  60 802 62  852 63  974  66 1.045 66 1.146 68  1.236 69 
Cávado 500  70 588  70 693  70  797  70 944 73  1.022 75  1.156  78 1.257 79 1.393 82  1.403 78 
Douro 504  71 616  73 744  75  830  72 849 66  977 72  1.061  72 1.154 72 1.315 78  1.312 73 
Alto Trás. Montes  398  56 488  58 606  61  731  64 850 66  873 64  966  65 1.035 65 1.109 66  1.181 66 
Beira Inter. Norte  457  64 562  67 692  70  791  69 907 70  948 70  1.036  70 1.128 71 1.191 70  1.251 70 
Beira Interior Sul  558  79 672  80 799  80  913  80 1.052 81  1.092 80  1.224  83 1.414 89 1.381 82  1.450 81 
Alto Alentejo  577  81 718  85 835  84  859  75 921 71  1.011 74  1.090  74 1.226 77 1.372 81  1.432 80 
Alentejo Central  533  75 644  77 772  78  836  73 925 72  1.034 76  1.120  76 1.216 76 1.370 81  1.528 85 
Baixo Alentejo  506  71 660  78 784  79  796  69 811 63  866 64  1.014  69 1.094 69 1.157 68  1.219 68 
Algarve 737 104 874  104  1.042  105 1.204 105 1.398 108 1.415 104 1.472 100 1.585 99 1.703 101  1.815 101 
Border total  522  74 633  75 759  76  858  75 971 75  1.033 76  1.134  77 1.233 77 1.345 79  1.411 79 
Source: INE – Portugal 
 
In the case of Spain, this time for the 1987-1998 period, the situation is very similar to that seen 
in Portugal. The growth in per capita GDP has been equally continuous for all the border regions and, 
with respect to the national total, all have had a per capita GDP that is considerably lower than the 
national mean, in most cases a differential of more than 20% being maintained (in 1998). Overall, the 
Spanish border regions in terms of per capita GDP converged slowly with respect to the national mean, 
passing from 74% in 1987 to 80% in 1997. 
  
Regarding the differences in behaviour between the different units, it would be possible to 
differentiate the border regions that, in relation to the per capita GDP, have converged more intensely   9
(Salamanca, Cáceres and Ourense) from those that have shown a more restricted convergence (Huelva, 
Badajoz and Zamora) or none at all (Pontevedra). 
  
For the Spanish case, and in relation to the positioning of the border regions within the domestic 
context, one finds exactly the same situation as in their Portuguese counterparts; that is, although timidly, 
the border regions have converged with respect to the national mean. This does not correspond to a 
change in the position of these regions within the national context because, in the same way, not only a 
large part of the convergence comes from the demographic route (the loss of population in the Spanish 
border regions, despite being less intense than the Portuguese ones, was accompanied by a demographic 
growth in the national set), but also a stagnation was observed in the weight that the GDP of all the border 
regions has had in the national total. 
  Within this sphere, both for the Portuguese case and for the Spanish one, “the number of 
inhabitants is an ambivalent factor; it acts as a divisor in the per capita indices, but is the final cause of 
the dividend. Depopulation and lagging behind go together as cause and effect -like the migrations of the 
sixties and seventies, whose populations  grow old, become poor-  and lead the zones whose their 
population is  dwindling to lose their dynamic status, generating in exchange a positive chain of 
construction, services, infrastructures, market increases, etc., in the emigrant-receiving zones” 
(GARCIA, 2001: 627). 
 
Chart 2 – Total and relative per capita GDP (national total =100) in the Spanish border 
NUTS 3 level for the 1987-1998 period 
(x1.000.000 Pts.) 
  1987    1989    1991    1993    1994*   1995*    1996*    1997*    1998* (a)   
National Total   1,009 100  1,263  100 1,522  100 1,737 100 1,776 100  1,918  100  2,036 100 2,158  100 2,304  100 
Huelva 0,761  75  0,937  74 1,100  72 1,230 71 1,343 76  1,521  79  1,631 80 1,729  80 1,847  80 
Salamanca 0,798  79  1,027  81 1,289  85 1,485 86 1,579 89  1,708  89  1,831 90 1,949  90 2,089  91 
Zamora 0,704  70  0,898  71 1,069  70 1,238 71 1,304 73  1,389  72  1,511 74 1,594  74 1,712  74 
Badajoz 0,599  59  0,765  61 0,957  63 1,073 62 1,151 65  1,229  64  1,343 66 1,440  67 1,522  66 
Cáceres 0,759  75  0,976  77 1,177  77 1,329 77 1,435 81  1,548  81  1,703 84 1,814  84 1,953  85 
Pontevedra 0,873  87  1,114  88 1,347  88 1,462 84 1,574 89  1,671  87  1,754 86 1,851  86 2,011  87 
Ourense 0,681  67  0,906  72 1,138  75 1,259 72 1,366 77  1,478  77  1,564 77 1,662  77 1,759  76 
Border 
NUT III   0,750 74  0,959  76 1,170  77 1,305 75 1,405 79  1,515  79  1,624 80 1,724  80 1,848  80 
Source: Renta Nacional de España y su Distribuición Provincial. Série Homogénea años 1955 a 1993 y avances 1994 a 1997, Fundación BBV, 1999 
(a) Source: Fundación BBV             
 
 
  In the case of these regions, it can be said that in terms of developmental level and in comparison 
with the scenario prevailing at the beginning of the eighties, we are now witnessing a positive evolution 
in the post-EC adhesion period. Nevertheless, we should not forget that this evolution was accompanied 
by an anaemic reinforcement from intra-national economic cohesion and an inept repositioning of the 
border regions within the national contexts. 
  
If the spatial units serving as a basis for this short analysis were able to present a greater degree 
of separation, so as to acknowledge spatial units that truly approach the border regions, the result  would   10
be relatively different since, as a rule and for the border NUT3 level, the true border sectors are per se 
highly peripheral areas  within the context of these same units. This problem is more pronounced in the 
Portuguese part owing to the great extension of some of the units analysed, of which the Algarve or 
Cávado are a good example since they only contain a very small border sector. Territorial knowledge and 
certain relevant information (in particular, that referring to economic and fiscal activities) would allow us 
–in relation to the per capita GDP- to clearly note a divergence with respect to the national mean if we 
were to analyse the spatial units of truly border nature. 
 
 
The Very Limited and Profoundly Divergent Trans-border Integration with the Process of Economic 
Fusion Between Portugal and Spain. 
  Although the two Iberian countries were economically distanced for a large part of the twentieth 
century, the situation changed in 1986 with the simultaneous incorporation of Spain and Portugal into 
the European Economic Community. Regarding Portugal, in the opinion of many analysts the most 
important outcome of this adhesion was rapid economic integration with Spain, the large neighbouring 
country (…). After little more than 15 years, the result cannot be closer to that prediction: currently 
Spain is the first provider and second client of the Portuguese economy (AZEVEDO, 1999: 61) From the 
Spanish perspective, economic approach to Portugal has been equally as intense. From 1985 up to 1999 
the bulk of imports originating in Portugal out of all Spanish imports more than tripled and the weight of 
exports to Portugal out of all Spanish exports quadrupled. In sum, we have seen an accelerated process of 
approach and integration between the two economies, such that in this new century it would not be 
untrue, mainly for the Portuguese, to speak of economic fusion between the two countries. 
  
This process of economic approach is equally valid for the case of the border regions, since 
relative to international commerce –as regards both imports and exports- the trend in the past few years 
has been in the sense of increasing the economic interaction of these units with respect to the 
neighbouring country, this being very pronounced on the Portuguese side. However, it is not possible to 
infer from this that the economic interaction between the Spanish and Portuguese border regions is strong. 
For example, with respect to certain cases that in terms of exterior commerce have shown a strong and 
clear economic interaction with the neighbouring country it has been reported (CARAMELO, 1990) that 
economic interaction is not synonymous with trans-border integration at the level of the production 
system. We refer here, for example, to the absence in this environment of an effective job market, logistic 
and distribution networks, concerted R+D actions, etc. That is, the dependence in relation to commerce 
with the neighbouring country is large but the bulk of this same commerce between business companies 
present in markets that are spatially close but territorially separated by an international border is much 
smaller. In this sense, in general it seems clear that trans-border economic integration (between 
contiguous border regions) -unlike what was announced and foreseen- has been limited and fairly 
divergent with the process of economic fusion between Portugal and Spain. 
   11
The Problematic Circumscription of the Border Regions within the Larger Process of Economic and 
Territorial Reorganisation on the Iberian Peninsula. 
  As we concluded above, despite the somewhat impetuous and yet profound process of 
integration between the Iberian economies, in the last 15 years this did not occur in a generalised way at 
trans-border scale. In fact, the general strategy concerning Spanish-Portuguese economic integration was 
based on a logic of what could be termed the “Iberiaisation” of the markets; that is, an attempt to see 
Portugal and Spain in the light of a single market and not on the basis of strategies aimed at regional 
proximity. Both countries had sufficiently similar economies, at least as regards relative price structures 
and comparative advantages, to not justify intense dynamics of mobility or the transference of productive 
units from one side to the other. Direct investment and the entry of new companies –whether Spanish or 
Portuguese- “Will not be governed, structurally, by comparative costs; the advantage of Portugal as 
regards salary costs will tend to become increasingly smaller and was not even relevant in the past; it 
will take into account the location of the population, performance and acquisitive potential in all 
activities in which proximity to consumers and final clients is important; and it will take advantage of the 
opportunities that arise through many different possibilities, without no decision concerning systematic 
localisation deriving from this” (AZEVEDO 1999: 63). 
  
In spatial terms, national logic (in some cases nationalist in nature) has been surpassed and 
emphasis is now placed on the comparative advantages in terms of accessibility to markets outside the 
Iberian Peninsula and on the proximity of the large Iberian markets of final consumers. This type of logic 
implies a markedly selective territorial impact; that is, –on the one hand- it covers areas that are well 
connected by different forms of transport, with clear support for the main coastal areas, and –on the other- 
the main urban/demographic agglomerations, in contrast to the interior part of the Peninsula (except 
perhaps the cases of Madrid and Zaragoza). 
  
In this sense, in a simplified way one could identify five large areas as the main vertices of the 
dynamics and development of the Iberian Peninsula: namely, the Cantabrian area (centred mainly on the 
Basque country); the Ebro River Diagonal (the diagonal between the Basque country and Catalunya); 
Catalunya itself and its prolongation to the south across the Mediterraanean Arc; the Community of 
Madrid and, finally, the coast of Portugal between the Setúbal peninsula and the Cávado valley. On a 
second level, one could refer to the case of the Andalusian coast and, in a different environment, the 
archipelagos of the Balearic Islands and the Canary Islands. Focusing our attention on the case of the 
border, it is easy to see that -with the exception of the coastal areas, in this case the two extremes of 
Minho-Galicia and, although to a far lesser extent, the Algarve-Huelva- the remaining territory will not be 
affected (nor used) to the same degree by this process of territorial and economic reorganisation. This is 
intimately linked to the peripheral and marginal character of the border regions in terms of comparative 
advantages, in particular in the field of accessibility and of the dimension of their own markets. 
 
Some Specific “Inertias” of the Border Regions.   12
  As may be seen, the problems of development and positive territorial integration of the border 
regions cannot be separated from the problems of regional asymmetries (or from the processes involved 
in their genesis) currently prevailing on the Iberian Peninsula. However, in the case of the border there are 
additional and highly specific problems – its historical background, the long process of marginalisation, 
the resistance to articulation generated (still) by the border, the personal “inertia” of the inhabitants, etc- 
that the process of European integration and the new model of development and relations have proved to 
be unable to overcome. 
  
It would be out of the scope of this work to offer a detailed presentation of the difficulties or 
“inertias” typical of the Spanish-Portuguese border in the last fifteen years since the problem per se is 
extremely complex and of a vast dimension. Nonetheless, we cannot but offer a short series of reflections 
about some points that we consider to relevant in this sense. 
  
First, there is the issue of the actual historical background of marginalisation and the strong 
territorial “inertias” lived by the trans-border regions, which over past centuries on one hand promoted 
the disarticulation and separation of the trans-border territories and, on the other, cumulatively 
consolidated their peripheral character. In this process, one first has the needs for defence against “the 
other” and the imperative of national sovereignty (survival?), which structures border regions as a line of 
defence and, some of its pieces, as “chosen operation theatres”. Later, in the twentieth century, the 
dictatorial regimes and their policies of gradual separation promoted the control and policing of the 
border and structured the border regions as lines of separation, such that these regions were totally 
focused towards the interior of the respective countries. The result of this historical process is an almost 
perfect separation between the individuals and production media of the two nationalities, although at the 
same time a profound territorial, economic and social disarticulation “ scarcely broken at some points at 
which national needs for contact would create places for the control of the international flows or at 
which the cultural aspects and difficulties in survival inherent to the marginalisation of these areas 
fostered ancestral ties of binding” (CARAMELO, 1999: 741). That said, we believe that an attentive 
reading of the special nature and background of these regions clearly points to the notion that one should 
not expect that “the territorial integration and consolidation of trans-border regions happens short-term, 
almost by magic” (CARAMELO, 1999: 741). 
  
Intimately linked to the historical background is the issue of “mental inertia”. In fact, it would 
not be possible to rule out a relative degree of antipathy between both nationalities, due among other 
reasons to the above historical background, the times then lived, an education directed politically towards 
reinforcing national conscience (supremacy?) relative to “the other” and, above all, to a marked ignorance 
and respective lack of interest in overcoming this ignorance, which eventually led to the establishment of 
stereotypes that were easy to assimilate but difficult to discard. We believe that this scenario is 
completely discordant with “our own times”, now undergoing a profound transformation; it will hence 
always be a “generational” task, but never a short-term one. One of the manifestations of this “mental 
inertia” is a generalised absence of trans-border movement in support of the social and/or economic   13
areas. Actually, the lack of these “base” movements, both at institutional and at social level, was a huge 
obstacle to the implementation and success of the processes of trans-border cooperation, pitfalls that only 
now seem to be being overcome. 
  
To palliate some of these obstacles, of great importance were the specific community 
interventions for border regions, mainly the first and second INTERREG programs. Beyond the financial 
funds available for solving the particular and chronic problems of the border regions and promoting trans-
border cooperation activities, which would logically attract the attention of the agents, these programs 
also played an important didactic role as regards the potentials inherent in the promotion of trans-border 
integration. Nevertheless, these interventions proved to be somewhat diluted with respect to their original 
goals and the results obtained were inconsistent. The first of these Programs financed some important 
projects in local terms but they essentially lacked a true trans-border spirit; that is, no significant increase 
in trans-border integration emerged from them, largely owing to insufficient strategies and coordination 
between the two governments and also to the lack of tools for applying such strategies. Later, the second 
INTERREG, extending the eligible measures and reinforcing the budgeting component, found an 
application that followed -more or less- that of the first program: although there were some initiatives 
related to the “dynamisation” of business cooperation, such as business meetings and forums, stress 
should again be placed on the lack of coordination between both sides of the border. We believe that these 
interventions have to a large extent overlooked the historical background and have not sufficiently 
interiorised either the specificity of these regions or the basic aims proposed. In sum, with few exceptions 
the INTERREG programs will end up forgetting not only the actions of truly trans-border character but 
also the actual trans-border regions themselves. This will mainly occur either through a diffusion of the 
interventions in areas that, despite being chosen as targets are in no way true border regions, or through 
significant concentration on the main urban capitals (district or provincial capitals) of these areas. In this 
sense, these programs played a very small role as regards reducing the nefarious consequences of many 
decades of strong border “impermeabilisation” and  the marginalisation of the respective border regions. 
 
4.CONCLUSIONS 
  Along this article we have attempted to offer a brief summary of the evolution of the Spanish-
Portuguese border regions within the sphere of the process of European integration, emphasising the fact 
that despite the improvements seen in the past few years the process still contains some negative aspects –
more structural than of juncture- that to a large extent derive from their historical and geographical 
specificity. 
 
An overall analysis, such as we have been attempting to give, must necessarily be complemented 
with a meticulous observation at other scales, especially since each unit has appeared to assimilate the 
integration process in its own particular way. From here arises, among other things, a progressive 
tendency toward heterogeneity in situations within the sphere of the Spanish-Portuguese border, 
highlighting the importance of the regional singularities for a correct understanding of and intervention in 
these regions. Within this context, we feel it to be of interest at the end of this article to underscore certain   14
geographic elements that introduce a label, as it were, into current forms of trans-border organisation and 
relations: the dynamics typical of coastal areas, which tend to be more dynamic than interior areas; the 
difference between dry line and wet line (parts of the border in which the physical support is formed by 
rivers with strong currents), mainly because in the case of the wet line the physical support of the border 
establishes a natural element of first magnitude in the articulation of these spaces, although also in the 
forms of relations; the noteworthy geographic continuities of the mountainous areas, which not only 
separated ancestral forms of occupation but were also responsible for the problems of depopulation and 
disarticulation. 
  
In terms of the level of development, certain indicators relative to the border spaces point 
towards a very timid convergence within both national sets; this would largely be due to demographic 
regression. Within this context, the specific actions for the trans-border regions had a very limited role, 
due both to the poorly adjusted application and coordination of the interventions and to budget 
restrictions. Also, greater emphasis should be placed on the impact of other interventions such as those 
emerging from the sphere of the Structural Funds or the LEADER Community initiative (DIÉGUEZ, 
1998a). In any case, we believe that this evolution was insufficient to appropriately invert the cycle of 
marginality and to reposition these spaces with the national peninsular spheres, much less at Community 
level. If by convergence one understands the approach of the levels of the quality of life and welfare of 
the citizens from the border regions to those found in more developed areas of the Iberian Peninsula, the 
conclusion to be drawn from the above analysis is that the border regions remain far behind the rest of the 
Community and its regional policies; as a tool for reinforcing cohesion and convergence in these areas, it 
will have to be much more incisive in its attempt to reduce the inequalities within the specifically trans-
border areas. 
  
In conclusion, from all of the foregoing we believe that in the case of the Spanish-Portuguese 
border it has not been entirely possible to put into practice the whole of the new model of relations and 
development and gain from it all the potential that the model presumably contained. In this sense, if at 
Community level it can be concluded that “in economic terms the regions with internal borders in the EC 
cannot, in general, be seen as having more difficulties than other regions, due-on one hand- to the scope 
of the economic integration within the Union, and-on the other- to the success of the INTERREG 
initiatives (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2001: 34), we consider that for the case in question it will be 
necessary to find more time and invest much more effort if the new model arising from the entry of Spain 
and Portugal into the EC is to be able to produce its most positive effects in the border regions and if such 
regions are to be able to be seen as “not having more difficulties than others”.  
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